Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Dorann Mitchell v. Jesse Christensen and Betty
Christensen : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George E. Harris, Jr.; Callister, Nebeker & McCullough; Attorney for Appellee.
Scott B. Mitchell; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Mitchell v. Christensen, No. 990321 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2138

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
*

*

DORANN MITCHELL,

*

*

*

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff/Appellant,

*

vs.
JESSE CHRISTENSEN and BETTY
CHRISTENSEN,

Case No. 990321-CA
*

Priority 15

Defendants/Appellees.

PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE DENNIS M. FUCHS PRESIDING

Scott B. Mitchell (5111)
2469 East 7000 South
Suite 204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Attorney for Appellant

George E. Harris, Jr. (4781)
CALLISTER, NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorney for Appellees

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

DEC 2 9 1S99
Julia D'Aiesandro
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT ~F APPEALS
*
I " >KANII

' r"I"i|,ll£"!I J ,

*

APPELLANTfS REPLY BRIEF
*

P1a i n t i f f / A p p e 1 1 a n t ,

*

vs.
J E S S E CHRISTENS KIN! urn I t i l l I i
CHRISTENSEN,

ii

;

*
*

Defendants/Appellees.
*

•

r i o n ty

: 5

•

*INTIFF'S APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE DENNIS M. FUCHS PRESIDING

*

*

*

*

S c o tt B. Mitche11 (51 11)
2469 East 7000 South
Suite 204

S a l t Lake Ci t y , U tali 8 4121

Attorney for Appellant

George E. Harris, Jr. (4781)
CALLISTER, NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 8413 3
Attorney for Appel 1 ees

TABLE OP CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

ARGUMENT

1

I.

II.

Adoption of defendants1 idea of "reasonable
inspection" would render it virtually impossible
to bring a cause of action for fraudulent
nondisclosure

1

The doctrine of caveat emptor is not applicable
to this case

4

CONCLUSION

4

MAILING CERTIFICATE

5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Maack v. Resource Design & Const.,
875 P. 2d 570 (Utah App. 1994)

Inc.,

Horsch v. Terminix Intern.
Co.,
865 P.2d 1044 (Kan. App. 1993)

2,4
2, 3

' Authorities
Restatement

(Second) of Torts,

i

Section 551

2,3,4

ARGUMENT
I.

Adoption of defendants" idea of "reasonable inspection"
would render it virtually impossible to bring a cause of
action for fraudulent nondisclosure.
There is no dispute that: (1) plaintiff inspected the

swimming pool herself and hired a professional inspection company
to inspect the pool for her; (2) the leaks at issue in this case
were not visible and were in fact not discovered either by
plaintiff or by her inspection company; and (3) the inspection
report prepared by the inspection company was limited:
Our review is limited to above ground or visible items only.
It is an operational inspection of the accessible equipment
and components and is therefore limited in scope. If
concerned, client is advised to have a licensed pool company
perform an in-depth review and/or service.
(R.107)(emphasis added).
The dispute in this case is over whether (in spite of the
fact that there was no reason for her to be concerned) it was
reasonable for plaintiff not to have an in-depth review of the
pool by a licensed pool company.
not.

According to defendants, it was

Defendants would have this Court determine when a buyer has

exercised reasonable care in inspecting property as follows:
"A buyer can decide the extent to which he will inspect the
property. A buyer could choose not to even look at the
property, or could choose to have all aspects of the
property inspected. It is the buyer's choice; the buyer
decides the level of risk that is acceptable to him. The
seller is not a guarantor of all aspects of the home..."
Brief of Appellee at page 7.
Essentially, what defendants are asking this Court to accept
is the proposition that unless the buyer performs an in-depth
inspection of every aspect of the home, then, by definition, the
1

buyer has failed to exercise unreasonable care.

That is not, as

defendants suggest, the rule of law recognized by the Maack1
court, nor any other court of which plaintiff is aware.

And for

good reason: it is difficult to conceive of a defective condition
which could not be discovered by an in-depth inspection.

The

formula suggested by defendants would all but eliminate the cause
of action for fraudulent nondisclosure, leaving the buyer to
beware.
Termite damage could easily be discovered by a professional
termite inspector.
Co.,

Nonetheless, in Horsch

v„ Terminix

Intern.

865 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Kan. App. 1993), a case cited with

approval by this Court in Maack, the court held that termite
damage was a material defect which the seller would be required
to disclose.
Similarly, the Restatement

(Second)

of

Torts,

section 551

provides the following illustrations of cases warranting the
imposition of liability for fraudulent nondisclosure
notwithstanding the fact that the defective condition could be
discovered by an in-depth inspection:
3. A sells to B a dwelling house, without disclosing to B
the fact that the house is riddled with termites. This is a
fact basic to the transaction [which must be disclosed].
.. . •

9. A sells B a dwelling house, without disclosing the fact
that drain tile under the house is so constructed that at
periodic intervals water accumulates under the house. A
knows that B is not aware of this fact, that he could not
1

Maack

v.

Resource

Design

& Const.,

App. 1994).
2

Inc.,

875 P.2d 570 (Utah

discover it by an ordinary inspection, and that he would not
make the purchase if he knew it. A knows also that B
regards him as an honest and fair man and one who would
disclose any such fact if he knew it. A is subject to
liability to B for his pecuniary loss in an action for
deceit.
(Emphasis added).

Finally, comment 1 to section 551 provides the

following example of a case where there is liability for
nondisclosure:
...a seller who knows that his cattle are infected with tick
fever or contagious abortion is not free to unload them on
the buyer and take his money, when he knows that the buyer
is unaware of the fact, could not easily discover it, would
not dream of entering into a bargain if he knew and is
relying upon seller's good faith and common honesty to
disclose any such fact if it is true.
Restatement

(Second)

of

Torts,

section 551, comment

1.

Under each of the above sets of facts, the buyer would
clearly be able to discover the defective condition by an indepth inspection of the property and, in defendants1 view,
failing to do so would have no claim for fraudulent nondisclosure
against the seller.

As the cited authorities indicate, however,

that is not the law.

There is no question that termite damage

could be discovered by a professional termite inspector.
Nevertheless, the Kansas court in Horsch

held that termite damage

was a material fact which the seller would be required to
disclose.

865 P.2d 1044, 1048-49.

Similarly, there is no

question that defectively constructed drain tile could be
discovered by an "in-depth" inspection.

Illustration 9 to

section 551, however, finds liability where the defective
construction could not be discovered by an "ordinary inspection."
Finally, the fact that cattle are diseased could certainly be
3

discovered by a veterinarian's inspection.

Again, however,

comment 1 to section 551 states that the seller is "not free to
unload them on the buyer and take his money."
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the swimming pool
leaks at issue could have been discovered by an in-depth
inspection by a licensed pool company.

They were not, however,

visible and they were not discovered by plaintiff's personal
inspections of the pool nor by her professional inspection
company.

Defendants, on the other hand, were well aware of the

leaks and could have easily disclosed their existence,,
II.

The doctrine Of caveat emptor is not applicable to this
case.
Defendants' discussion of the doctrine of caveat emptor is

superfluous.

Defendants are either entitled to summary judgment

in connection with plaintiff's fraudulent concealment/ fraudulent
nondisclosure claim, or they are not.
end of the case.

If they are, that is the

There is no reason to then go on and apply the

doctrine of caveat emptor.

On the other hand, if this Court

determines that defendants owed plaintiff a duty to disclose the
known defective condition of the swimming pool, caveat emptor is
See Maack,

simply not an available defense.

supra,

875 P.2d at

579 (a duty to disclose exists in a vendor-vendee transaction
where a defect is not discoverable by reasonable care).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that she satisfied her duty
to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the swimming pool.
Accordingly, plaintiff requests that the trial court's Order
4

Granting Motion for Summary Judgment be reversed and that this
case be remanded to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
DATED this / J

dky of December, 1999.
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